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ABSTRACT 
Constraints on Diplomacy: The Rise of Right-Wing Political Cultures in Israel  
By 
Shadi Jafari  
 
In recent years, extreme right parties have received considerable electoral support and 
mounting influence in Israeli politics. This thesis will examine the Oslo Accords of 1993 as 
the catalyst of the new-radical right in Israel, and the state’s neoliberal economy that has 
shifted towards the manufacturing and export of advanced weapons and security expertise as 
the global factors that have shaped the rise of new right-wing political cultures in Israel. The 
study will then analyze the social factors that have appealed to the Israeli public to vote for 
parties that espouses radical-right views by exploring the influence of roughly one million 
Russian immigrants to Israel beginning in the 1990s, and the exploitation of existential fears 
experienced by most Jews. The study will specifically focus on two case studies: the 2014 
war on Gaza, also known as Operation Protective Edge, and the reelection of Benjamin 
Netanyahu as the crystallization of a new-post peace extreme right-wing culture in Israel. 
The thesis will also illustrate how social movements in Israel, and within the larger 
Palestinian global solidarity movement, have attempted to resist and expose global and social 
origins of new militarism in Israel by engaging in nonviolent resistance, boycotting 
institutions that benefit from the illegal occupation, and demanding justice.   
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Introduction 
On March 17, 2015 Israeli citizens went to their respective poll sites to vote in the 2015 
Israeli Legislative Elections. Approximately twenty-six political parties ran for the 120 
parliamentary seats available in the Knesset—“these parties represent[ed] the broadest 
spectrum of Israeli society from far-left to far-right, Israeli-Arab to Jewish nationalists, 
secular to ultra-Orthodox and everything in between” ("Israeli Elections,” 2015). Against the 
backdrop of the failed peace talks as a result of Israel’s minimal engagement towards 
diplomatic efforts to end the ongoing conflict in the region—many were hoping that the 
upcoming elections would change the current trajectory Israel was on by ensuring that the 
radical-right within Israel did not receive the majority of the seats in the Knesset. In the 
context of contemporary Israel, ‘new’ right wing cultures/parties “espouse views motivated 
by nationalism, racism, anti-democracy, and xenophobia,” rather than focusing primarily on 
territorial issues which constitute the ‘old’ extreme right culture (Freeman, Kaner, & Kaplan, 
2014). Thorough analysis in this introduction, and throughout the subsequent chapters, 
indicate that the rise of the right wing political culture in Israel has led to a masculinized state 
focused predominately on security, rather than attempting to resolve the country’s 
outstanding conflict surrounding its illegal occupation of Palestine through diplomatic 
means. 
The elections were positioned against two main political factions within Israeli 
politics: the conservative right-wing Likud Party, and the center-left Zionist Union. Prime 
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s Likud party ran on a platform that prioritized security and 
the intrinsic Jewish character of the state, while simultaneously focusing on economic 
prosperity for the Jewish people. The Zionist Union, however, concentrated more on social 
  2 
and economic inequalities present in Israel—and were committed to strengthening ties with 
the US and the international community by focusing on various domestic and foreign policy 
issues ("Israeli Elections,” 2015). A few weeks prior to the elections, it was projected that the 
two parties were extremely close in their race to hold the majority of the seats in the Knesset. 
The winning party would dictate the state’s affairs for at least another four years—which 
prompted Netanyahu to go on a media campaign that promoted conservative, right-wing 
statements and ensured the Jewish population that he—and his party—would do whatever it 
takes to ensure Israel’s Jewish character as a nation-state.  
 However, Netanyahu had his fair share of controversial moments during his campaign 
for reelection. For instance, he spoke before the U.S. Congress a month before the elections 
at the invitation of Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner without going through the 
Obama administration—which was a clear breach of etiquette, and disregard for the 
administration and their diplomatic work towards ensuring a nuclear deal with Iran. In the 
final days of campaigning, “Netanyahu [also] abandoned a commitment to negotiate a 
Palestinian state - the basis of more than two decades of Middle East peacemaking - and 
promised to go on building settlements on occupied land” (Baker & Heller, 2015). Such 
problematic statements were inconsistent with the work done by the Obama administration to 
facilitate peace in the region. This shows that the radical right in Israel has no interest in 
peace because it can continuously reap economic and political benefits in the occupied 
territories without negotiating. Netanyahu later called upon Jewish citizens to go to the polls 
and vote in order to counter the “droves” of Arab voters—a divisive and racist remark, 
especially from an official who represents a supposedly fair and equal ‘democratic state’ 
(Gerstedfeld, 2015). On Election Day on March 17th, “more than 4 million, or 71.8 percent, 
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of eligible voters cast ballots in the Israeli legislative elections […] the national elections 
[that] year broke records with the highest voter turnout in the century” ("Netanyahu Party,” 
2015). The elections culminated with the reelection of Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu 
and the Likud Party holding the majority of the seats in the Knesset.  
 The 2015 elections solidify the shift in the political history of Israel—the trajectory 
from kibbutz socialism to the extreme right. In the beginning of the twentieth century before 
the establishment of Israel, Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe aimed to become one 
with their ancient homeland by merging two ideologies: Zionism and Socialism ("The 
Kibbutz,” n.d.). Zionism is the “national movement for the return of the Jewish people to 
their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel” ("Zionism,” 
n.d.). History has shown that before the establishment of Israel, Jews were largely dispersed 
around the world with no concrete state to call their own. In addition, centuries of religious 
persecution and discrimination around the globe made many Jews long for a place where 
they could practice their religion in peace. In order to begin the process of establishing a 
Jewish home in what was then historic Palestine, Theodore Herzl requested the delegates of 
the Zionist Congress to create a specific fund for the Jewish people in order to acquire 
acreage in their ancient homeland. In 1901, the Jewish National Fund was officially 
created—and within two years the organization was able to buy its first plot of land in 
Ottoman Empire controlled Palestine ("Jewish,” n.d.). The first Jewish settlers to live on the 
land decided to adopt socialism as their blueprint towards “working the land and creating a 
new kind of community, and a new kind of Jew—stronger, more giving, and more rooted in 
the land” (Schultz, 2009). The interweaving of Zionism and socialism resulted in a 
communal settlement known as the kibbutz in Hebrew, which is a “rural community; a 
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society dedicated to mutual aid and social justice; a socioeconomic system based on the 
principle of joint ownership of property, equality and cooperation of production, 
consumption and education” ("The Kibbutz,” n.d.).  
 The early Jewish Eastern European settlers wanted to realize the Marxist principle of 
distributive justice to ensure equality and establish a system where community members 
could create a life living off their sacred land.  
 In the early years, kibbutz members worked mostly in agriculture. Instead of 
 earning individual incomes for their labor, all money and assets on the kibbutz 
 were managed collectively. In keeping with the ideal of total economic equality, 
 kibbutz members ate together in a communal dining hall, wore the same kibbutz 
 clothing, and shared responsibility for child rearing, education, cultural programs, and 
 other social services (Schultz, 2009).  
By the time Israel was sovereignly recognized as a Jewish state, there were around 26,550 
individuals living on kibbutzim and their number had grown to over 80 thriving communities 
throughout the state ("The Kibbutz,” n.d.). The communities represent a true, democratic 
society. For instance, “the general assembly of all its members formulates policy, elects 
officers, authorizes the kibbutz budget and approves new members. It serves not only as a 
decision-making body but also as a forum where members may express their opinions and 
views” ("The Kibbutz,” n.d.). Currently, there are about 270 kibbutzim varying in size with a 
total population of around 120,000 Jews, which constitute about 2.8 percent of Israel’s 
current population (“About Kibbutz,” n.d.). Which begs the question: how does a nation built 
on the fundamental values of socialism and equality become one in which participates in 
policies of racialized dispossession? This thesis will examine the vital shift in political 
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ideologies and identify the specific social and global factors that have occurred throughout 
Israel’s history that have produced Israel’s new radical right and militaristic culture.  
 The analysis begins with the Oslo Accords of 1993, which acted as a catalyst for the 
radical right in Israel to expand their original ideologies based on territorial matters in the 
region and emerge as a new political group espousing harsh views on xenophobia, security, 
nationalism, and the promotion of anti-democratic values in order to challenge directly 
whatever progress had been made during the peace process between Israel and Palestine that 
had been in play since the early 1990s. The global neoliberal economy also points to the 
relentless appetite for violence that has led to the emergence of a hyper-masculine, 
xenophobic state. “Under the aggressive politics and culture of neoliberalism, society is 
increasingly mobilized for the production of violence against the poor, immigrants, 
dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age, gender, race, ethnicity, and color” 
(Girouz, 2005, p.12). This will be examined by analyzing the shift from Israel’s traditional 
based economy to one that focuses primarily on the production and specialization of the 
high-tech industry, which includes manufacturing a variety of lethal weapons and adopting 
various exclusionary security processes. “In fact, the only basis of national consensus in 
Israel is that there is a need to cope with the threat to its existence, and that this can be done 
only by means of the country’s own armed might” (Yaniv, 1993, p.12).  
 The thesis will then focus on social factors in Israel that have had a substantial impact 
on the political expansion and influence of the radical-right. For instance, the influx of 
roughly one million Soviet Jews into Israel in the beginning of the 1990s contributed 
significantly to changing the political landscape of the country because of the Russians 
distain for Communist ideology and Islamophobic past. Another social factor that is 
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important in the context of the radical right is the exploitation of the existential fears 
experienced by most Jews when warned about possible threats to their future. In the context 
of Israel, it is important to note that “Netanyahu has made the population’s fear of the threats 
looming over them into the linchpin of his discourse. Fear is construed along the border 
separating ‘us’ (the true people) from ‘them’ (the foreign enemy, the Arabs, and their 
domestic allies…)” (Filc, 2010, p.74). Netanyahu and other members of the radical-right 
engage in fear mongering in order to be seen as the strong, protective political party—the 
only one in fact, that can rid the country of the ‘parasites’ that have weakened the state of 
Israel (Filc, p.74).   
 However, before we begin our in-depth analysis on the fundamental factors that have 
led to the rise of the radical right in Israel, it is essential to highlight that Israel is not the only 
state in contemporary history that has experienced such a political trajectory. Many countries 
within Western Europe such as France, Belgium, Germany, and Denmark dealt with a rise in 
right-wing populist groups around the 1980s. In the liberal democracies across Western 
Europe after World War II, political stability was short lived (Betz, 1993, p. 413). “The 
resurgence of ideological and political turbulence in the late 1960s, rising social conflicts in 
the early 1970s, and the spread of mass protest by new social movements in the 1980s were 
symptoms of a profound transformation of Western European politics” (Betz, p. 413). Much 
like in contemporary Israel,  
 Radical right-wing populist parties [in Western Europe] are radical in their 
 rejection of the established sociocultural and sociopolitical system and their 
 advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and a drastic reduction of the 
 role of the state. They are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social 
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 equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups, and in 
 their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. They are populist in their 
 instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their  appeal to 
 the common man and his allegedly superior common sense (Betz, p. 413).  
The success of radical populist groups in Western Europe during this period can be 
attributed to two factors: “rising levels of immigration and political dissatisfaction” (Knigge, 
1998, p. 272). In 1989, a study conducted on xenophobia and racism in Western European 
communities projected that about 11 to 14 percent of the populace was “troubled by the 
presence of people of other nationality, race, or religion. Among the citizens of the EC, 
Belgians, Germans, French, and Danes were particularly sensitive about immigrants. Overall, 
5 percent of the population of the member states considered immigrants the most important 
problem facing their respective countries” (Betz, 1993, 415). For instance, between 1980 and 
1991 the immigration of Asians, Africans, and other non-Europeans increased by over a 
hundred and ten percent. In 1991 alone, over 50 percent of foreign voters in Italy were from 
Asia and Africa, and 40 percent of refugees living in Switzerland came from the same 
geographical areas (Betz, p. 416). “As a result, Western European countries are confronted 
with a sizable number of non-Europeans, whose physical difference makes an impression far 
beyond their number. This can be contributed to the perception that Europe is being 
‘invaded’ by alien traditions, cultures, and religions” (Betz, p. 416).  The issue of 
immigration not only highlights exclusionary perspectives but also sheds light on “the mass 
publics’ economic fears: perceptions of incompatible group interests and a struggle over 
scarce material resources” (Knigge, p. 270).  
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 France’s French Front National (FN) was the most significant new populist right wing 
party in Western Europe, and served as a model for other radical right parties in neighboring 
countries in the 1980s (Knigge, p. 253). The first major electoral success of the Front 
National was in 1984 after running on a platform that favored restrictive policies towards 
immigrants and exclusionary nationalism. Their central argument was that “the vast majority 
of refugees only claim to be political refugees. In reality, they are driven by economic 
factors. This hurts Western European societies twice. Immigrants not only burden social 
services with new expenditures, but they also take away scare jobs from the native 
unemployed” (Betz, p. 416). France, like other Western European countries, strongly 
objected any notion of multiculturalism and espoused views of xenophobia, and “national 
chauvinism” against immigrants from around the globe (Knigge, p. 255).   
 It is important to note the parallels between the conditions that have led to growing 
populist parties in both Israel and Western Europe. The 1980s in Western Europe was 
“marked by disenchantment with the major social and political institutions and profound 
distrust in their workings, the weakening and decomposition of electoral alignments, and 
increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility” (Betz, p. 413). A few years later in 
1993, Israel’s society would too become politically fragmented as well—between those who 
wanted their government to engage wholeheartedly in diplomatic talks with the Palestinians, 
and those who did not trust their beloved Israel to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin whom 
seemed too eager to put up the Jews’ sacred land in exchange for peace. Similarly, Israeli 
society is currently dealing with an immigration problem. As of 2013, the “Jewish population 
numbers approximately 6.042 million residents (75.3% of the total population); the Arab 
population numbers approximately 1.658 million residents (20.7%); and the population of 
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“others,” referring to non-Arab Christians, members of other religions, and persons not 
classified by religion in the Ministry of the Interior, numbers 318,000 (4.0%) (Center Bureau, 
2013).  These demographics are particularly troubling—especially among the radical-right 
who believes that Israel is a Jewish state. Therefore, the almost twenty-four percent of 
individuals in Israel who are not Jewish “threaten Israel’s Jewish majority and the Zionist 
project itself” and must be uprooted (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 2). These non-Jews are also 
acquiring necessary resources in terms of subsidized housing, social security, and overall 
acreage of land that was intended to be dedicated specifically to the hardworking Jewish 
people—subsequently creating an us versus them mentality.  
 Neoliberalism has also played a substantial role in attracting support towards radical 
right groups, in both contemporary Israel and the Western European countries in the early 
1980s and 1990s. “Within the discourse of neoliberalism, democracy becomes synonymous 
with free markets, while issues of equality, radical justice, and freedom are stripped of any 
substantive meaning and used to disparage those who suffer systemic deprivation and chronic 
punishment” (Girouz, p. 9). Free markets bring about social suffering for many individuals; 
cuts in social programs, a decrease in public spending, and comprehensive privatization 
across the public sector (Betz, p. 418). “Individual misfortune, like democracy itself, is now 
viewed as either excessive or in need of radical containment” (Girouz, p. 9). In many 
instances, empathy is replaced with the belief in the survival of the fittest, in which societies 
favor individual advancement, shutter at the misfortune of their countrymen, and loathe 
immigrants whom they believe are absorbing all of their natural resources. Unfortunately, in 
the case of Israel, this has taken a much more violent turn—especially when one views the 
current trajectory Israel is on towards the mistreatment of Palestinians in besieged Gaza.  
  10 
 In the past six years, Israel has conducted three separate military incursions against 
the Palestinian population living in besieged Gaza: Operation Cast Lead (2009), Operation 
Pillar of Defense (2012), and the deadliest occurring in the summer of 2014, Operation 
Protective Edge ("Gaza Crisis,” 2014). In 2009, “Israel launched a military assault on Gaza 
that left more than 1,400 dead over the course of three weeks […] violence erupted again in 
November 2012 with a military escalation that saw more than 400 killed in Gaza—mostly 
civilians” (Blumenthal, 2015, p.6). This type of violence and unilateral control is not 
uncommon when discussing the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories—
which is one of the reasons why Secretary of State John Kerry attempted to restart the peace 
process in the beginning of July 2013 after the protracted failure of diplomacy based on the 
Oslo Accords of 1993. Nine months into the peace process, however, the negotiations 
collapsed because Israel refused to continue on a diplomatic road to peace if Hamas—the 
official political party in Gaza since 2006—would partake in the discussion. Prime Minister 
Netanyahu claims “Hamas is a murderous terror organization that emphasizes in its charter 
that its goal is to destroy Israel,” (A., and T., 2014). The Jewish state agreed to engage with 
the Palestinian Authority’s Fatah, which has been the official government of the West Bank, 
but refused to acknowledge Hamas despite the unity government Fatah and Hamas agreed to 
form weeks earlier after seven years of political strife between the two largest political 
factions in the occupied territories (Elgindy, 2015). “Without Hamas’ participation any 
diplomatic results of negotiations would likely have been of questionable value […] Hamas 
has repeatedly indicated its willingness to reach a long-term normalizing agreement with 
Israel if and when Israel is ready to withdraw fully to the 1967 borders and respect 
Palestinian sovereign rights” (Falk, 2014).  
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 Prior to Israel officially suspending the peace process, however, it was evident that 
the state had no intention of reconciling with their Palestinian neighbors. During the nine 
months of diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement to end the historic conflict, Israel 
authorized “13,851 new housing units in the settlements, added significant amounts of 
available land for further settlement expansion, and demolished 312 Palestinian homes. 
These acts were not only unlawful, but actually accelerated earlier settlement trends” (Falk, 
2014). It became increasingly difficult from the Palestinian perspective to trust that the peace 
process would bring about sustainable change—especially since Israel continued to take 
provocative stances that jeopardized the negotiation. It quickly became apparent that Israel’s 
hawkish policies would not allow for effective dialogue with the Palestinians to take place. 
 With yet another ineffective attempt to put an end to the historic conflict, Netanyahu 
and his cabinet members shifted their attention towards the unity government recently 
formed by Hamas and Fatah in the occupied territories. “Netanyahu said the new government 
should be shunned because it leans on support from Hamas, a group labeled as terrorist by 
the West. Abbas ‘said yes to terrorism and no to peace,’ Netanyahu said after a meeting with 
his Security Cabinet” (The Associated, 2014). Although Israel has been vehemently against 
any kind of unity government with members of Hamas at the negotiating table, it is important 
to recognize that there cannot be any kind of viable reconciliation without the cooperation of 
the two largest, and most important political factions within the occupied territories. 
Regardless of the positive implications of the historic move towards finally establishing a 
strong, unified government for all Palestinians in the occupied territories— Israeli officials 
treated Fatah’s agreement with Hamas as a directed threat against the livelihood of the 
Jewish state and immediately began threatening to retaliate against the unity government. 
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Just a few weeks later, Israel had the opportunity to make good on their promise of retaliation 
after the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers, allegedly led by members of 
Hamas on June 12, 2014.  
 Israeli officials wasted no time scapegoating Hamas and the newly formed unity 
government for the disappearance of three Israeli teens in the West Bank (Masi, 2014). 
Within hours there were angry, violent Jewish mobs in Jerusalem screaming “ ‘Death to 
Arabs!’ and searching for Palestinians to assault […] as active duty Israeli soldiers took to 
Facebook to demand revenge, posting photos of themselves with the weapons they said they 
were aching to use, political upstarts rushed to issue calls for the ‘annihilation’ of Hamas” 
(Blumenthal, p. 17).  The Israeli government called for an immediate crackdown in the 
occupied territories in order to locate and rescue the three boys; yet in “reality, it was 
targeting the organization that Netanyahu had held collectively responsible for the crime—
Hamas—rounding up hundreds of its members including scores of those released under the 
2011 prisoner swap for the captive soldier Gilad Shalit” (Blumenthal, p.13). Unfortunately, a 
little over two weeks later Israeli authorities found the deceased bodies of the three Israeli 
teenagers. At this point, around June 30th, Hamas and the IDF were already exchanging fire 
on a small scale—Hamas engaging in fire as a response to the violent home invasions and 
unjust arrests of its members by Israeli officials (Masi). Hamas continued to deny its 
involvement with the death of the three teenagers; “several jihadist groups, including one 
linked to al Qaida, claimed responsibility for the three murders, but Netanyahu maintained 
that "Hamas is responsible and Hamas will pay’" (Masi). Within the next week, Israel 
launched “Operation Protective Edge” a war on Gaza that exemplified the practice of 
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disproportionate use of force and collective punishment by Israel on the besieged Arab 
population.  
 Operation Protective Edge was the longest and most lethal of the three systematic 
military attacks on Gaza. Operation Protective Edge lasted fifty-one days; fifty-one days of 
non-stop assault from a military power that made insufficient efforts to differentiate between 
military facilities and single-family unit homes, or between combaters and ordinary-civilians. 
What is most frightening however, is that such acts of violence are commonplace today in 
Israel and throughout the occupied territories. For example, in July 2014 the “Jewish Israeli 
public […] told pollsters from the Israel Democracy Institute that they supported the war in 
Gaza at levels of 95 percent, with at least 45 percent complaining that the army had not used 
enough force (Blumenthal, p. 120). Operation Protective Edge, also known as the 51-Day 
War, resulted in the death of about 2,100 Palestinians—“more than 70 percent were 
confirmed civilians—and wounding well over 10,000; it pulverized Gaza’s infrastructure. 
Over 400 businesses and shops had been damaged in targeted Israeli strikes, and at least 120 
were completely obliterated; 24 medical facilities were damaged” including Gaza’s only 
“geriatric rehabilitation facility” (Blumenthal, p.195).  
 Before the 51-Day War, Gaza only had one power station that was responsible for 
providing electricity to the majority of its inhabitants. During the attack, IDF soldiers 
targeted that power station—which has currently resulted in the majority of the population to 
be without electricity for the majority of the day. As a Canadian doctor working in Gaza 
states, “people are drying in Gaza quite often, regularly, every single day because of the lack 
of electricity” (Gadzo, 2016). Without electricity, doctors can no longer perform simple, life 
saving tasks without the necessary electricity needed to power their equipment. Innocent 
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children are falling off steep ledges of apartment buildings to their death because they cannot 
see a few feet in front of them in pitch darkness—this is not a humane environment meant for 
anyone living in the twenty-first century (Gadzo, 2016). Yet, “perhaps the most disturbing 
figure was the more than 18,000 civilian homes the Israeli military leveled during the assault 
on Gaza, leaving at least 100,000 homeless or forced to cram into the already overcrowded 
homes of relatives” (Blumenthal, p. 198). During the 51-Day War the IDF employed “39,000 
tank shells, 34,000 artillery shells, and 4.8 million bullets were supplied during the fighting. 
Senior military figures estimate that land forces alone used at least 60 percent of the 5,000 
tons of ammunition given to them, but the IDF cannot yet evaluate it accurately” 
(Blumenthal, p. 136). The small physical size of Gaza, combined with the fact that it is one 
of the most densely populated areas on the planet begs the question of why the Israeli 
Defense Forces found it necessary to employ such excessive and unnecessary amounts of 
force and ammunition to subdue the Palestinian population. It also must be noted that it is 
almost unprecedented in modern warfare to lock civilian inhabitants in a war zone.  
 At the end of the military attack, “Israel lost 71 individuals, of whom 65 were 
members of the IDF, with 469 IDF members and 261 civilians wounded, while at least 75 
percent of the Palestinian casualties were civilian, including 513 children” (Falcone, 2015). 
The relatively low number of casualties on the Israeli side and the intentional targeting of 
Palestinian civilian establishments by the IDF illustrates the disproportionate use of force 
employed by the Israelis on the Arab population; which is the embodiment of the prevailing 
security and militarized political culture in the Israeli state. Unfortunately, it has become 
normal within mainstream Israeli discourse to “favor a broad array of policies aimed at 
forced segregation, discriminatory laws and population transfer” (Blumenthal, p. 112). As 
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Israel continues to engage in violence and state sponsored terrorism that saturate the lives of 
ordinary Palestinians, it will become increasingly difficult to stop Israel on its path towards 
ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Arab population throughout historic Palestine.   
 However, the world has not turned its back on Palestinian suffering; the global 
solidarity movement that encompasses activists, politicians, students, and academic 
institutions from around the globe continue to address and combat Israel’s xenophobic and 
aggressive policies. After 68 years of occupation, the Palestinians finally have an 
international movement that continues to grow and thrive everyday—with the Boycott 
Divestment Sanction (BDS) movement just being one recent example. It is essential to 
highlight that with every new illegal checkpoint, roadblock, or aggressive screening put in 
place in the occupied territories by Israeli Defense Forces, the more resilient the Palestinians 
become. Nonviolent demonstrations continue to take place almost daily as Arabs across the 
occupied territories and in Israel refuse to be silenced and mistreated. Palestinians, with the 
help of the international community, demand accountability and just treatment for everyone 
living in Israel and the occupied territories. No matter how difficult the uphill battle is for 
Palestinians to ensure their rights, it is essential to remember that it is not a matter of if the 
occupation and Israel’s violent policies will end—it’s a matter of when.  
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Chapter 1: The Restructuring of the Radical Right and the Rise of Israel’s Security Economy 
 
 This chapter will trace the first significant step towards the rise of the new radical 
right in Israel, the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was initially believed to offer the 
promise of effective diplomacy and a historic move on both parties to end their decades long 
conflict. “In the five years following the 1993 agreement, more than 600 people were killed 
by extremists who opposed the peace process. The extremists succeeded in disrupting the 
peace talks before lasting peace was achieved” (Abdelmoez, n.d.). Unfortunately, the Oslo 
Accords instead acted as a catalyst for the radical Right to restructure their stance focused 
primarily on territorial issues and emerge as a new political group espousing views of 
nationalism, xenophobia, security, and anti-democratic values. The rise of the radical right 
has resulted in the escalation of violence in the region, which can directly be linked towards 
Israel’s security based economy. In order to begin to understand why violence takes 
precedence today over peace in Israel/Palestine, one must examine the Oslo Accords and 
how its implementation created conditions for the emergence of a new radical Right in Israel. 
Comparably, it is important to understand that the ongoing violence does not exist inside a 
vacuum; years of failed peace talks, wars, and an ongoing military occupation have resulted 
in a militaristic and securitized political culture in Israel that is currently epitomized by 
Israel’s security economy.  
 For many Arabs and Jews alike, the date September 13, 1993 represented an 
opportunity for peaceful coexistence and the recognition of mutual political and civil rights 
in Israel/Palestine. The signing of the Accords by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn 
in Washington D.C., appeared to solidify both parties’ commitments to lasting peace. 
  17 
Although the Oslo Accords set the framework for reconciliation; however, it was not a peace 
treaty. The Accords established “interim governance arrangements and a framework to 
facilitate negotiations for a final treaty, which would be concluded by the end of 1998” 
(“Oslo,” 2013). The two parties came to agree on seventeen articles called the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) that essentially stipulated that a transitional period of no more than five 
years was necessary before leading to permanent status negotiations to ensure that 
Palestinians were able to effectively control the areas of Gaza and West Bank’s Jericho, 
which were both formally in Israel’s control. After the five-year transitional period, it was 
agreed upon that both groups would reconvene at the negotiating table to tackle controversial 
issues plaguing both Arabs and Jews: the settlements, Jerusalem, borders that would make up 
an independent Palestinian state, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees of 1948 
(Meital, 2006, p. 33).  
 The Declaration of Principles enabled Palestinians to partially control their own 
affairs after decades of Israeli rule. The document stated that within four months of the 
signing ceremony, all Israeli military troops in Gaza and Jericho would be withdrawn and a 
Palestinian Self-Government Authority would take its place to ensure social order and 
receive sovereign power (Meital, p. 34). Simultaneously, “elsewhere in the West Bank, Israel 
undertook to transfer power to authorized Palestinians in five spheres: education and culture, 
health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism” (Shlaim, 2005, p.33). Part two of the 
Oslo Accords took place on September 28, 1995, which detailed the expansion of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), created the Palestinian Council outlining its powers and 
responsibilities, and allowed for the free movement of Palestinians between the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank. In addition, the agreement subdivided the West Bank region into three 
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zones: A, B, and C, to effectively relieve control of Israeli power and transfer control and 
responsibility for security to the PA, minimizing the presence of Israeli Defense Forces and 
security apparatuses in hundreds of villages within the West Bank (Meital, p. 43). “The Oslo 
Accords basically consist[ed] of three chief elements: recognition of the state of Israel by the 
PLO and vice versa, the institution of a ‘peace process’ in the transitional period, and a 
commitment to achieve a permanent status agreement where most entangled issues will be 
resolved” (Meital, p. 32). However, the most significant development during the Oslo 
process was the realization that in order for there to be lasting peace between the two groups, 
both would have to accept the idea that it would be “based on partitioning the disputed land 
into two states” (Meital, p. 2).  
 The Oslo Accords, which became internationally known as the “peace accords,” 
created discordant factions within all aspects of Israeli society. A substantial number of 
Israelis, including Knesset members, rejected the notion of a peace process based on 
“historical, religious, and national grounds” (Meital, p. 32). Consequently, weeks after a 
historic move towards reconciliation, Israel’s society was divided into two opposing camps. 
The Peace camp led by Prime Minister Rabin was dedicated to completing all the agreements 
set out during Oslo, whereas the National camp led by Benyamin Netanyahu was focused on 
derailing the peace process and protecting Israel’s national interests.  Benyamin Netanyahu, 
then head of the Likud Party, claimed that the Oslo Accords jeopardized the young state of 
Israel by consenting to a Palestinian state and left the country defenseless against its violent 
neighbors. Many agreed and could not fathom how it was possible that the government was 
willing to make any kind of concessions with the leaders of the PLO—which just a few 
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months prior—had been identified as a terrorist organization known for endorsing armed 
resistance to liberate historic Palestine.  
 Responding to what they believed was a road to disaster, the traditional right held on 
to the belief that Israel could still exert control over Gaza and the West Bank as long as the 
agreements were not finalized. Therefore, they began organizing around the idea that 
Palestinians already had a state—in neighboring Jordan. The radical right argued that the 
conflict would be resolved if all Palestinians moved to Jordan where they already constituted 
the majority of the population. Many claimed that Jordan was Palestine and that all of Israel 
(that is, the Palestine Mandate administered by Britain) belonged solely to the Jews, thus any 
type of territorial concessions would be unnecessary (Meital, p. 99). The right quickly 
recognized that the Jordanians would not tolerate arguments that criticized its national 
heritage, culture or history. They argued that Jordanians and Palestinians were two separate 
entities, and that Palestinians had the right to stay in their national homeland that they have 
occupied for thousands of years, instead of creating an artificial state with no historical ties or 
affiliation. Palestinians and Jordanians alike also claimed that the Palestinian people, just like 
the Israelis, had an inherent right to self-determination. Although the idea of a Palestinian 
population transfer to Jordan failed miserably, the right continued to stay active in their fight 
to combat the rhetoric of “land for peace.” Specifically, they capitalized on the one of the 
biggest faults within the Oslo Accords: the ambiguity surrounding the settlements.  
 The right embarked upon their new mission of expanding existing illegal settlements 
in order to confiscate and occupy land, which after the transitional period of the Oslo 
Accords would make it increasingly more difficult to dismantle. “Settlements are illegal 
Jewish-only communities built by Israel for its citizens on territories it occupied in 1967” 
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(American, n.d.). In 1990 there were approximately 78,600 settlers in the occupied territories 
(Meital, p. 36). The first plan initiated to extend settlements after the Oslo Accords was 
called Operation Double. Through the coalition of politicians, activists and the ultra-
Orthodox, the right began to create “satellite settlements next to existing ones” to increase 
the population of Jews in Palestinian areas (Pedahzur, 2012, 109). Within a matter of months, 
resources allocated to expanding settlements and ensuring the safety of settlers rose rapidly. 
In addition, the government of Israel sponsored construction within the settlements at an 
unprecedented rate on the grounds of “national increase and security needs” (Meital, p. 36). 
By September 2004, the settler population increased by over two hundred percent compared 
to figures prior to the Oslo Accords (Meital, p. 36). The confiscation of Palestinian land, 
water, and resources solely for the Jewish population has been deemed illegal; and in the 
eyes of Palestinians and the international community, it delegitimized the peace accords and 
Israel’s commitment to lasting peace.   
 Although the settlements continued to expand, the loss of Israeli autonomy in the 
West Bank and Gaza was enough to convince segments of the Israeli population of the 
disastrous path the state was heading towards. The shift between the traditional right and the 
new radical right in Israel were solidified through two gruesome acts: the Hebron massacre, 
and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. On February 25, 1994 Dr. Baruch 
Goldstein, a devout Orthodox Jew and father of four, went into the West Bank town of 
Hebron and fired over two hundred live bullets onto an unsuspecting group of five hundred 
Muslims kneeling in prayer at their local mosque. In a manner of minutes, over twenty-nine 
people were killed and over a hundred were wounded. This was one of the most horrid 
episodes of violence in Israel’s young history (Sprinzak, 1991). Prime Minister Rabin was 
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quick to denounce the violence and claimed it was the sole act of a madman, not of a devout, 
God-fearing Jew. However, many Israelis praised the actions of Goldstein and claimed that 
his actions were a direct intervention from God to put an end to the government’s 
commitment to the peace process. Goldstein ultimately worried about the “existence of the 
Jewish people and [felt] that only an extraordinary act would stop what he considered a most 
serious deterioration in the nation’s condition and the lack of response to the increasing and 
worsening acts of terror” (Sprinzak, p. 241). The act of terror inflicted on the Palestinians by 
the messianic doctor served as a stark warning; the ultra-Orthodox and the radical right were 
not ready for any type of compromise with the enemy and would resort to unprecedented acts 
of violence if anymore power or territories were transferred to the Palestinian Authority. The 
use of violence threated the democratic foundation of the state of Israel because its citizens 
were no longer willing to engage in a civil manner when presented with internal issues which 
they disagreed on. In addition, by targeting and discriminating against Palestinians in the 
occupied territories and Arab Israelis in the state, Israel’s democracy was becoming to look 
more like an ethno-democracy, its rights and privileges reserved only for the Jewish 
population.  
 Ultimately, Dr. Goldstein failed at his mission of directly derailing the peace process; 
however, his actions did increase tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. Shortly after the 
massacre, “Palestinians and Israeli soldiers clashed all over the West Bank and Gaza, leaving 
nine Palestinians dead and nearly two hundred wounded” (Sprinzak, p. 1). On the Israeli side, 
Muslim terrorist attacks significantly increased with violence aimed towards civilians and 
infrastructures. The escalation of violence and the uncertainty that plagued the lives of 
Israelis after the Hebron massacre were not blamed on the heinous act committed by Dr. 
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Goldstein, but rather on the two architects of the Oslo Accords—PM Rabin and Foreign 
Minister Shimon Peres—for inevitably ‘strengthening’ Palestinian armed groups such as 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The radical right blamed Rabin and Peres for “ordering Israeli 
soldiers out of Gaza and Jericho, allowing the formation of a large, armed Palestinian police, 
and [for] relaxing the anti-Palestinian struggle of the nation’s security forces,” which covered 
their hands in Jewish blood as much as it did Hamas’ (Sprinzak, p. 254).  
  To ultimately cease the implementation of the PA Plan outlined in the Accords, 
Yigal Amir set out to finish Dr. Goldstein’s plan of derailment once and for all. On 
November 4, 1995 as Yitzak Rabin was leaving a peace rally in support of the Oslo Accords, 
twenty five year old Yigal Amir, an Israeli ultranationalist, shot the Prime Minister at point 
blank range as he was getting inside his vehicle. Within a matter of hours the Prime Minister 
of Israel was pronounced dead, making it “the first political murder of the Jewish nation’s 
senior leader in nearly two thousand years” (Sprinzak, p. 245). The murder of Rabin did not 
take place in a vacuum; it was the accumulation of an “unparalleled campaign of political 
delegitimation against the ruling Labor government and character assassination of Rabin and 
Peres” (Sprinzak, p. 4). For many Israelis, the assassination of the Prime Minister crystallized 
the failure of the peace process. As a result, within a matter of months Israel witnessed one of 
its most concentrated “delegitimation campaigns” in history (Sprinzak, p. 252). The religious 
camp—which composed a large percentage of the radical right—produced pamphlets, held 
prayers, protests, and sermons to remind the public of the deteriorating safety of Israeli 
citizens due to the government’s senseless acts in accordance with the Palestinians (Sprinzak, 
p. 252).        
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 In 1996 after months of diligent work, the radical right finally secured a victory 
within the government to impede the peace process: the unexpected win of Benjamin 
Netanyahu over Peres as Israel’s next Prime Minister. The Israeli population voted for 
change; they were no longer interested in engaging in dialogue surrounding peace with their 
neighbors. “For the first time, the helm of the state was placed in the hands of a man who 
considered Oslo to be a serious historic blunder and its implementation inimical to Israel’s 
vital national interests” (Meital, p. 46). It was no secret that Netanyahu was against the Oslo 
Accords and blamed the peace process for the increased instability and violence that shook 
the state. However, many were left wondering how a politician with such views could 
possibly “conclude the transitional stage as well as negotiate and settle permanent-status 
issues” stipulated by the DOP. The answer was simple—he wouldn’t (Meital, p. 46). 
 Netanyahu’s three years in office were a continuous campaign to destroy any and all 
advancements towards peace outlined in the Oslo blueprint. He constantly used xenophobic 
language—insisting that Palestinians could not be trusted, and that Arafat was nothing but a 
“liar” and a “terrorist” with no real motives to achieve peace with the Israelis (Meital, p. 46). 
Moreover, the government under Netanyahu dismissed schedules of implementation outlined 
by the DOP, adopted ‘unilateral decisions,’ and took full advantage of the absence of an 
invested third party to look over and settle disputes between the Israeli government and the 
Palestinian Authority (Meital, p. 46).  
 In hindsight, the Oslo Accords were a historic failure—there was no mention of the 
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and the fact that the US was an 
intermediary despite its special relationship with Israel was increasingly problematic. It did 
nothing to better the lives of ordinary Palestinians living under occupation, and increased 
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violence and instability in the region. Worse of all, the “peace process” acted as a catalyst for 
the radical right to re-evaluate their initial stance on essential issues and emerge as a 
“multifaceted political movement that [has become] the dominant force in Israeli politics” 
(Pedahzur, p. 4). The radical right quickly acknowledged that peace with its neighbors were 
no longer a necessity for the wellbeing of their country, and began using the occupation and 
constant security threats to their political and economic advantage.  
Israel’s Security-Based Economy 
 The current securitized political culture in Israel stems from the radical right’s 
intricate relationship with the country’s high-tech security economy. Productivity in the high-
tech industry has shot up 66 percent [since 1975] (Sales, 2016).  Israel’s high-tech security 
economy is based on the perpetuation of violence and war; therefore, any notions of peace 
greatly damage Israel’s national interests as the country has built its empire on the premise of 
continuous conflict. Through the examination of Israel’s economy in the past decade and the 
seemingly endless confiscation of Palestinian land, one can begin to understand the intricate 
framework that constitutes Israel’s militarized culture. 
 In the 1990s, Israel’s economy was “the most tech-dependent economy in the world,” 
specifically focusing on information and communication technologies and mainly exporting 
“traditional goods and high technology” (Klein, 2007). However, the country’s reliance on 
technology proved to be problematic when in the year 2000 the Dot-Com bubble began to 
burst. By June 2001, Israel was hit hard by the Dot-Com bubble; “the country went into 
immediate free fall and […] analysts were predicting that roughly three hundred high-tech 
Israeli firms would go bankrupt, with tens of thousands of layoffs” (Klein, 2007, p. 550). The 
government quickly intervened by enforcing drastic cuts to social services and increasing 
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military spending by about 10.7 percent (Klein, p. 550). By early 2002, military expenditures 
calculated as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 8.4 percent in 
2001 to 9.6 percent (Stockholm International, 2015). The government also began advocating 
for the tech industry to expand its expertise beyond communication and information services 
to one that focused solely on surveillance and security (Klein, p. 550). The switch over from 
a traditional goods and services economy to one that focuses solely on high-tech security 
expertise permeates a hyper-masculine, militaristic culture within Israel that thrives on 
conflict in order to illustrate to the global community that Israel knows how to protect itself 
against violent aggressors after decades of internal and external threats.  
 After the Dot-Com burst, Israel established itself as the world capital for homeland 
security products and policing tactics. This self-proclaimed expertise led to immense 
prosperity for the country, especially following the events of 9/11. The radical right in Israel 
used the terrorist attacks on the twin towers as an opportunity to empathize with, and 
strengthen the bond between the United States and Israel. They did so by claiming they both 
had a common enemy: Muslims, which expanded and internationalized the discourse of fear. 
By working together and establishing intricate networks that dealt with safeguarding both 
countries’ national security, Israel was able to grow and capitalize off its defense and security 
industries. For example, the “Israeli Export Institute estimates that Israel has 350 
corporations dedicated to selling homeland security products, and 30 new ones entered the 
market in 2007” (Klein, p. 542). According to Israel’s Export and International Cooperation 
Institute, the country’s fields of expertise include, but are not limited to, “border protection 
and surveillance; virtual and physical perimeter protection systems for land-based and 
maritime sites; inspection systems for vehicle and cargo scanning at border crossings 
  26 
airports, and seaports; countermeasures against potential terror attacks; IED/remote control 
bomb jammers […] and riot control solutions” (Cohen, n.d.). 
 All of these security tactics essentially allow for Israel to engage in war with its 
neighbors—and us them as guinea pigs for their new ‘innovative security measures’—while 
simultaneously building an empire worth billions. For instance, in 2012 Israel’s high tech 
security industries set record exports of $7.5 billion dollars, most stemming from the Asia-
Pacific region (Abunimah, 2014, p.10).  According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 
“Israel [is] the 10th largest arms exporter for the period of 2009-2013, accounting for 2% of 
world deliveries” (Stockholm International, 2015). Between 2004 and 2011, arms deliveries 
from Israel were estimated to be worth around $10.6 billion—with just $1.8 billion coming 
from 2011 alone ("Israel among,” 2012). “Israel is also one of the world's largest arms 
buyers, mostly from the US. Israel signed $9.5 billion in arms transfer agreements in 2004-
11, including $5.9 billion in 2008-11), making it the world's ninth largest arms buyer” 
("Israel among,”). The homeland security boom has created a drive for violence; essentially, 
the Palestinian refugee camps and the occupied territories have turned into laboratories for 
Israeli officials to test out new weaponry and forms of security (Abunimah, 2014, p. 11).  
 Yet, the security sector goes beyond arms exports and imports; it also creates 
immense profit for private health care companies who tend to wounded soldiers, for 
construction companies who employ xenophobic language to build more checkpoints, walls, 
and borders, and for the oil and gas companies within Israel (Klein, 2007, p. 537). Israel’s 
high-tech industries may not sound like much, especially when compared to other countries 
on a global scale, yet it is important to remember that Israel is a small, relatively young 
country no larger than the size of New Jersey. With a population of just over eight million 
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people, Israel has become the metropolis for defense and security industries with its economy 
heavily dependent on such militaristic advances (Central Intelligence, n.d.).  
 Unfortunately, the international community has been complicit in the cultivation of 
Israel’s militaristic culture; specifically with its number one ally, the United States. 
Advertised as the country on the “front lines of global war on terrorism,” Israel has also 
hosted top US national law enforcement associates from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the 
Federal Bureau Investigation, and the National Sheriffs Association, since 2002 (“World’s 
Largest,” 2008). A neoconservative think tank located in Washington D.C., the Jewish 
Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA), states that “it has brought more than one 
hundred federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to Israel as part of its Law 
Enforcement Exchange Program and has trained eleven thousand more law enforcement 
officers across the United States” (Abunimah, p.16). The topics and training provided include 
issues of foreign policy and national security, specifically ensuring the safety of the nation’s 
borders, control of a possible terrorist scene, responding to a suicide bomber, etc., ("Top 
Law,” 2013). The purpose of such training is essentially to illustrate to American law 
enforcement officials how to respond “effectively” to security threats, which is highly 
problematic considering the Israeli Defense Forces are one of the most masculine, violent, 
and oppressing military forces in the world. Law enforcement officials, in turn, come back to 
the United States believing it is acceptable to engage in unjust treatment of civilians and 
create an atmosphere of violent militarism to uphold the nation’s security against anyone 
they deem a threat. For instance, various branches within the U.S. defense forces have 
examined the use and precision of drones operated by Israeli officials—specifically for the 
use of surveillance and targeted killings of Palestinians—in order to “draw lessons for its 
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own wars” (Ophir, Givoni, Hanafi, 2009, p. 547). Israeli officials are able to persuade 
Americans to take on a harsher stance on issues regarding security because their illegal and 
unjust violence against Palestinians have worked to ensure the safety of Israelis and further 
eliminates any threat to the country’s national security. Success and amounting influence in 
the country’s high-tech industries do not “require Israel to have friendly relationships with its 
Arab neighbors or to end its occupation of its territories” (Klein, p. 549).  
 The illegal settlements occupied by Israelis on Palestinian land have contributed 
significantly to the building up of the economy of Israel, while simultaneously paralyzing 
any chance Palestine has of becoming a self-sufficient, independent state. Israel has 
continued to expand its settlements despite international criticism for decades for one 
fundamental economic reason: to establish and retain control over Palestine’s main resources, 
such as agricultural land and water.  The appropriation of Palestinian land has robbed the 
indigenous population of its richest agricultural soil, which Palestinians have relied on for 
centuries in order to farm and graze livestock (Foundation, 1998). This in turn allowed for 
the establishment of more settlements with endless opportunities of employment for Jews on 
the most fertile parts of the land. Israel has also seized control of valuable water—for 
example the mountain aquifer—that runs under the West Bank. Israeli citizens do not have to 
think twice about running water, whereas Palestinians constantly suffer from water shortages 
that deter their farming abilities and their health. For example, Israel employs the mountain 
aquifer for over extractions in agriculture, “as well as settlers' pools and verdant lawns. In 
2009, the Mountain Aquifer supplied forty percent of Israel's agricultural needs and fifty 
percent of its population's drinking water” (Silver, 2014). Israel has also continuously 
“prevented the Palestinian community from increasing its water use to barely 20 percent 
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beyond the amount used in 1967” while simultaneously consuming the majority of the water 
running through the West Bank and Gaza. The monopoly of Palestinian land and water has 
resulted in the continuous determent of peace negotiations between Palestinian and Jews as 
the radical right within Israel advocates for the necessity of settlements in order to sustain an 
increasing Jewish community and uphold its economic interests (Silver, 2014).   
 An examination of the siege on Gaza further illustrates how Israel uses conflict to its 
economic advantage. In June 2007 the Israeli government went against international 
humanitarian law and forcefully restricted the movement of over one and a half million 
people in Gaza. Israel unlawfully engaged in collective punishment on the citizens of Gaza 
and maintains complete control of the occupied territory’s land, air, and sea. The siege has 
effectively turned the area into a densely populated open aired prison that relies on the 
assistance of international organizations for its most basic needs. As one can imagine, the 
blockade has completely devastated Gaza’s advancement in economic development and has 
led thousands to become unemployed and reliant on foreign aid. The ban on the transfer of 
goods into Gaza made the area increasingly dependent on Israel. However, what most 
individuals do not grasp is that Israel effectively blocked Gaza out from the rest of the world 
in order to benefit its own companies. “Even the food supplies bought by UN agencies for 
the majority of Palestinians in Gaza who rely on humanitarian assistance are purchased 
predominately from Israeli companies and are paid for it with international aid money […] 
this puts the captive Palestinians among Israel’s top ten export destinations, ahead of the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, India, Japan, and China” (Abunimah, 2014, p. 110). 
Israel continuously uses the excuse of security to implement punitive policies against 
Palestinians, yet upon closer analysis, one can conclude that the real reason behind Israel’s 
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right-wing political culture is to ensure Palestine’s dependence on the state for its own 
economic benefit.  
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Chapter 2: Russian Migrants into Israel and the Manipulation of Existential Fear 
 
Roughly one million ex-Soviets of Jewish descent migrated to Israel in the beginning 
of the 1990s due to political and economic instability in their homeland. These newcomers 
brought along with them various ideologies and beliefs that helped the radical-right in Israel 
regain parliamentary control in the Knesset—ensuring a victory in the 1996 elections by 
selecting Benjamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister. Through the examination of 
democratic trends in conjunction with the current and ongoing state of existential fear 
experienced by Israelis, one can consider the social factors that have bolstered the racist and 
anti-democratic values that constitute the ideology of the radical right.  
The influx of Russian Jews into Israel in the beginning of the 1990s illustrates how 
the migration of one group into a country consisting of a relatively small population can shift 
its political landscape. Boris Yeltsin was the first President of the Russian Federation in 
1991. After the abolition of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin announced that he would transform 
Russia’s economy into one based on neoliberal free-market policies. Subsequently, the 
Russian parliament agreed to give the President one year of absolute freedom to impose as 
many reforms as needed in order to transform the economy into one that replicated the 
Chicago School of economics free-market ideologies (Klein, 2007, p. 277). Within a matter 
of weeks “Yeltsin announced the lifting of price controls, predicting that ‘the liberalization of 
prices will put everything in its right place’ […] the shock therapy program also included 
free trade policies and the first phase of rapid-fire privatization of the country’s 
approximately 225,000 state-owned companies” (Klein, 2007, p. 282). Yeltsin promised his 
constituents that these reforms would remake Russia into an economic titan; that in due time, 
people would realize how beneficial these reforms would be to the average Russian. 
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Unfortunately, that day never came, and instead “the Communist state was simply replaced 
with a corporatist one: the beneficiaries of the boom were confined to a small club of 
Russians, many of them former Communist Party apparatchiks, and a handful of Western 
mutual fund managers who made dizzying returns investing in newly privatized Russian 
companies” (Klein, 2007, p. 291). 
 After one year of Yeltsin’s economic reforms, “millions of middle-class Russians had 
lost their life savings when money lost its value, and abrupt cuts to subsidies meant millions 
of workers had not been paid in months. The average Russian consumed 40 percent less in 
1992 than in 1991, and a third of the population fell below the poverty line” (Klein, 2007, p. 
283). Russia’s new neoliberal economy had devastating consequences for the average citizen, 
and by 1996 about twenty-five percent of Russians were described as living under desperate 
conditions (Klein, 2007, p. 300). Unfortunately, neoliberalism also led to increasing tides of 
anti-Semitism in Russia. Jews were blamed for “all the tragedies of Russia, from Communist 
rule to economic problems and food shortages” (Siegel, 1998, p.16). Economic instability 
and the openly hostile climate towards Jews ultimately culminated in roughly one million 
Jews immigrating to Israel during the 1990s (Klein, 2007, p. 545).  
 Jews who came from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s now constitute an 
estimated eighteen percent of Israel’s population (Klein, 2007, p. 545). A population transfer 
of this magnitude inevitably altered Israel’s state of politics. The largest wave of immigrants 
from Russia, about 600,000, took place in 1993—just as Israel was embarking on the peace 
process with Palestinian leaders. During this period, Russians who came to Israel under the 
Law of Return were welcomed by government officials with open arms and friendly 
reminders that they “had not immigrated but rather returned to their ancient homeland” 
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(Pedahzur, 2012, p.14). Since Israel’s independence, the country has been committed to 
ensuring that Jewish immigrants from around the world have the ability to become Israeli 
citizens in their ancient homeland. Thus, it is not unusual for the relatively small country to 
receive a large influx of Jewish settlers from any part of the world. However, the case of 
Russian migrants are strikingly different from any previous immigration wave experienced in 
Israel—especially in terms of their education and Zionist-ideology. “Although only 26 
percent of the Israeli population in 1992 had 13 or more years of formal education, 61 
percent of the recently arrived Soviet Jews had achieved that level of education. Within that 
group, more than 42 percent had scientific and academic professional educations, a figure 
four times the Israeli average” (Reich, Dropkin, Wurmser, 1993, p. 465). This highly 
educated group undoubtedly altered various spheres of Israeli life—especially in terms of 
enhancing Israel’s military and technology industries. The Russian immigrants also 
contributed heavily in “educational, cultural and health care systems, and [were essential in] 
the opening of new internal and external markets” (Khanin, 2011, p.55). 
The majority of Jewish settlers immigrate to Israel because of their religion and/or 
their commitment to Zionism. However, Russian Jews entering Israel during the 1990s did so 
not based on religious fervor or Zionist-ideology, but to ensure their survival. Therefore, their 
arrival into Israel was not a “Jewish” or “Zionist” “immigration in the traditional or usual 
sense of those terms” (Reich, et.al., 466). Due to the political and economic instability in the 
Soviet Union at the time, the majority of Jews who fled the former Soviet Union saw Israel 
as their only viable option for escape. Thus, the Russian Jews of this period have continued 
to hold “intense and positive ties with their former homeland, in part because one-third of 
them are Russians married to Jews or mixed ethnics and have family members remaining in 
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the Former Soviet Union” (Remennick, 2015, p. 44). Many Russian immigrants continued to 
look back at their former homeland with admiration and longing, which is significant because 
unlike other groups who migrated to Israel, the new Russian migrants were not prepared to 
give up their culture or political ideology ingrained in them from the former Soviet Union.  
Inevitably, it quickly became evident that the new Russian immigrants would shift 
away from the customary center-left politics that constituted the Labor party, and embrace 
the ideology of the radical-right. They were escaping the “forceful Soviet political 
indoctrination they had experienced in the USSR. Many of these expatriates despised parties 
and ideologies that reminded them of the Communist party. In Israel, this resulted in 
animosity toward the Labor and Meretz parties” (Pedahzur, 2012, p. 124). Precisely because 
the Russians were welcomed by Israel’s institutions and came to believe Israel was their 
righteous homeland, they immediately began to develop a strong sense of distrust and 
animosity towards the perpetual other: the Arabs. “The immigrants’ dislike of the Arabs 
derived primarily from a dislike of the Central Asiatic nationals in the Soviet Union—read as 
Muslims—whom they saw as similar to Arabs” (Dropkin, et al., 1993, p. 468). Russian 
immigrants regarded Arabs as the main obstacle towards achieving the “state’s ethno-Jewish 
character,” which fueled xenophobia within Israel and led them to condemn the peace 
process led by the Labor party (Pedahzur, p.124).  
More specifically, the Russians could not fathom the fact that Peres was willing to put 
Israel’s holiest sites on the negotiating table in order to achieve peace with the Palestinians 
(Horing, 2013). Although many of the newcomers lacked a proper historical context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they “came from a massive country and were raised on a patriotic 
political culture that glorified conquests as well as the wide-open spaces of the motherland,” 
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which explains why they were so against surrendering part of their homeland to a group they 
considered their enemy (Pedahzur, p. 124). The arrival of the Russians into also Israel 
bolstered Zionist goals by increasing the proportion of Jews to Arabs while simultaneously 
reducing the state’s reliance on Palestinian labor (Klein, 2007, p. 546). The Russians 
provided the Israeli economy with a new source of cheap labor; therefore, Israel could seal 
off the occupied territories and disrupt the movement of Arabs into Israel. By doing so, Israel 
was able to preserve the Jewish character of the state and ensure that the occupied territories 
would become heavily dependent on the state for all its necessities, while simultaneously 
keeping a distance from the perpetuated “other”.  
In May 1996, around 400,000 new citizens were eligible to vote for the first time in 
Israel. Many of these newcomers were from the former Soviet Bloc and solidified a shift to 
the right by electing right-wing candidate Netanyahu over Peres as Prime Minister 
(Pedahzur, 2012, p.125). “In the mid-1990s, out of 170,000 Likud members there were 
27,000 Russian-speakers (including 20,000 immigrants who arrived after 1990), more than in 
any other Israeli political organization” (Khanin, 2011, p. 60). Many from the former Soviet 
Bloc voted for Netanyahu because they believed the peace process jeopardized Israel’s 
national interest; more specifically, many of them living in the illegal occupied territories at 
the time did not want to see Peres dismantling their land and home in order to create peace 
with the Palestinians. For Russian Jews, the fear of losing everything again was much 
stronger than their desire for peace among the Arabs.  
The Anatomy of Fear 
 The feelings of intractability and fear are crucial to understanding how the radical 
right manipulates fear in Israeli society in order for Jews to not only rely heavily on their 
  36 
nation’s security establishment, but glorify it. Zionism acted as the blueprints for the state of 
Israel, fear acted as its pillars. As uncertainty and anxiety of an impending conflict continue 
to plague ordinary Israelis, the radical right have successfully used these feelings of tension 
to convince the majority of their constituents that another Holocaust is around the corner, that 
their Muslim neighbors wish for their ultimate demise, and that Palestinians are all barbaric 
terrorists unworthy of their sympathy.  The objective of this passionate rhetoric is to create a 
toxic environment that ultimately fuels xenophobia in Israel in order to preserve the Jewish 
character of the state and divert any questions of accountability regarding Israel’s illegal 
occupation or it’s unwarranted militaristic stances. 
 Regardless of Israel’s military capacity and the amount of nuclear weapons the state 
possesses, Israelis live in constant existential fear. One can begin to understand this unique 
condition by examining the origins of the state. When Israel was founded in 1948, all those 
who immigrated to the newly found Jewish state were victims of  “anti-Semitism, 
discrimination, persecutions, and pogroms, which were widespread in their countries of 
origin for many centuries” (Pedahzur, 2012, p. 12). But in the Land of Israel, for the first 
time Jews were free—and they would ensure their survival by fighting for their land and 
never being subject to such dehumanizing conditions again (Shavit, 2015). This ideology and 
the history of anti-Semitism worldwide left distinctive scars on the young Jewish nation, 
which ultimately created a state that continuously battles with hopelessness and collective 
anxiety from its traumatic past (Pedahzur, p. 12). 
 Ari Shavit, a human rights activist and columnist for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, 
describes the condition of existential fear experienced by many Israelis on a day-to-day basis 
in his book, My Promised Land. Shavit explains that in Israel, for one to express fear is 
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taboo; yet, no matter how vibrant or fulfilling Israeli life is, there is always a sense that life 
can one day “freeze like Pompeii’s” (2015, p. 75). Although these dreadful feelings have 
accompanied Shavit since he was a teenager, in one particular passage he takes the reader 
back to Tel Aviv in 1991 during the first Gulf War to illustrate this sense of hopelessness that 
is intrinsic to Israeli society. Shavit recalls the suffocating sense of panic and distress during 
the war as many Israelis were afraid another Iraqi missile would target them or their loved 
ones as they were sleeping comfortably in their beds, walking to the grocery store, or driving 
to work. There were also rumors of a possible chemical weapons attack, which led thousands 
of Israelis to carry gas mask kits with them everywhere they went—suggesting that they 
knew another attack was imminent (Shavit, p. 63). Shavit recalls that “occasionally, when a 
warning sounded that a warhead was on its way, [they] shut themselves in sealed rooms with 
the masks on [their] faces. Although it turned out that the threat was not real, there was 
something horrific about this surreal ritual. [He] listened closely to the sounds of sirens and 
looked with dismay at the terrified eyes of [his] loved ones locked in German-made gas 
masks” (Shavit, p. 63). This particular passage illustrates Shavit’s feelings of helplessness 
during a time of war; yet, what the author tries to convey is that the same feelings of 
vulnerability never disappear, even when there are no sirens wailing off in the distance 
signaling immediate danger. Fear is present everywhere in Israeli society, and Israelis have 
become accustomed to it. Fear has become a political weapon with very real material results, 
such as Goldstein’s massacre. However, certain groups within Israel—such as the radical 
right—manipulate these feelings of distress, which have inevitably created a country with an 
incredibly high survival instinct, believed to be surrounded by enemies whose ultimate goal 
is to eradicate its existence. 
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 When a country believes and represents itself as being under perpetual existential 
danger from the moment of its conception, much can be permitted to it. The right’s strongest 
and most compelling tactic is manipulating fear, which is why Israel has been able to become 
a nuclear nation while simultaneously urging the international community to cease the ability 
of other countries in the Middle East from going nuclear. This fear has been magnified under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, most recently with respect to Iran. 
The Israeli government has been very vocal regarding its disapproval of the 2015 Iranian 
nuclear deal agreed upon by the Iranians and world powers (P5 + 1). The Likud-led 
government is particularly upset that the international community is willing to work with Iran 
to curb its nuclear program—as illustrated by Benjamin Netanyahu who recently went to 
Washington uninvited by the White House to express how much he disagrees with the 
nuclear agreement. Netanyahu stated that the agreement would, “be a farewell to arms 
control. And [that] the Middle East would soon be crisscrossed by nuclear tripwires. A region 
where small skirmishes can trigger big wars would turn into a nuclear tinderbox” (Baker, 
2015). The Prime Minister views a diplomatic solution with Iran as an effective means for 
Iran to continue its nuclear program, which he states is particularly concerning because it 
“threatens the survival of [his] country.” The Likud-led government engaged in such 
inflammatory rhetoric towards Iran’s leaders and the nuclear deal in order to accentuate and 
exaggerate the threats that would be present for Israel if Iran were to have gone nuclear.  
 Yet, Israel’s very own nuclear capacities began to emerge shortly after the 1967 Six-
Day war. After Israel’s shift victory “according to international publications, [Israel] built an 
arsenal of dozens and dozens of nuclear warheads: A-bombs and H-bombs, low yield and 
high yield, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines” (Shavit, 2015). Israel turned itself it’s a 
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“self-sufficient nuclear nation” and no longer had to rely on the British, Americans, or the 
French to protect its citizens against its hostile Arab neighbors (Shavit, 2015). The radical-
right in Israel believes it is solely their right to possess nuclear weapons because they are 
lodged between countries that harbor radical Islamists who wish to annihilate the only Jewish 
nation in the world. Allowing any country in the region to acquire or build nuclear weapons 
would be considered detrimental to the existence of the Jewish people in Israel.  
 The need for nuclear weapons and this heightened sense of security stem from a false 
notion of reality. Israel, if it ever was, is no longer a vulnerable stretch of land; Israelis have 
not faced imminent destruction in any of the wars it has engaged in since 1948. “This was not 
the case in 1967, nor even in the closely fought war of 1973, and certainly not in the 1956 
Suez War, the 1969-70 War of Attribution, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon” (Khalidi, 
2014, p. 78). Quite the contrary to the radical right’s discourse on Israel’s continuous 
existential threat—Israel has managed to strike terror on its underdeveloped and disorganized 
neighbors for years due to its own advanced military and hegemony it holds in the Middle 
East (Khalidi, p. 75).  
 Fear mongering has become an essential feature of mainstream Israeli discourse in 
order to install xenophobia into society and preserve the white, Ashkenazi-dominated Jewish 
character of the state. Calls for ethnic cleansing and a “broad array of policies aimed at 
forcible segregation, discriminatory laws, and population transfer” towards Palestinians and 
refugees from various countries are not uncommon beliefs espoused by the radical-right 
(Blementhal, 2015, p. 112).  Netanyahu has recently claimed that immigrants from Africa 
threaten the nation’s democratic values and its Jewish foundation (Abunimah, 2014, p. 35). 
“Even more striking, at the height of the fear mongering against immigrants, Interior 
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Minister Eli Yishai had declared, ‘Muslims that arrive here do not even believe that this 
country belongs to us, to the white man.’ Ethiopians could perhaps, begrudgingly, be 
recognized as Jews, but they could never pass as white” (Abunimah, 2014, p. 35). Arab-Jews 
are included in the population of people treated as second-class. They occupy a strange in-
between space between “white” Ashkenazi Jews and the “enemy Arab.” By instilling fear of 
the “other,” the radical right has been able to establish a society where no one questions why 
there is an innate hierarchy in regards to who is granted basic human rights. According to the 
radical-right, anyone who does not fit the requirement of a white, Jewish individual does not 
deserve to live in a country that is reserved exclusively for Jews; anyone else will be treated 
as a second-class citizen in a state that defines itself as democratic.  
There are far-reaching consequences of a society living in constant anxiety and fear. 
For instance, because Israelis live in constant existential fear they have adopted an elastic, all 
encompassing definition of security that “takes precedence over virtually everything else, 
including international law and the human rights of others” (Khalidi, p. x). Thus, it should 
come as no surprise that Israeli soldiers and “settlers attack Palestinians with complete 
impunity, whether for fun or to take their land” because the international discourse has 
always been one that highlights the existential angst of Israelis, never those of Palestinians 
(Abunimah, p. 12). Members of the radical right continue to engage in fear mongering in 
order to indoctrinate the public with a sense of mistrust and paranoia against individuals who 
are not of Jewish descent; thus, making Israelis more dependent and sympathetic towards the 
Right’s ideology of security and anti-democratic values.  
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Conclusion: Combatting Israel’s Radical Right  
Various systems of oppression are no longer only synonymous with an unjust tyrant or 
confined to the global South. Today, repressive regimes throughout the world have 
revolutionized their tactics and adopted dialogue that make it difficult for one to distinguish a 
nation built on true democratic values, versus one who’s government freely and willingly 
engages in institutionalized systems of oppression. Living in an increasingly interdependent 
and globalized world today, it is incredibly difficult, even impossible, for one to turn a blind 
eye to injustices occurring around the globe. As one of the longest standing military 
occupation of the twenty-first century, Israel continuously engages in practices that enable 
the government to acquire illegal land through the practices of ethnic cleansing, home 
demolitions, and the use of extreme force on the indigenous population. Many individuals of 
conscience around the world continue to be perplexed as to how Israel continues to 
implement apartheid laws and regulations against the Palestinian population without 
significant repercussions from the international community. “The Obama administration, 
moreover, has arguably been more active than any of its predecessors in using its 
international clout to shield Israel from any consequences for its actions” (Abunimah, 2014, 
p. 46).  More specifically, it leaves many baffled to know that Israel continues to wage unjust 
war and violence against the Palestinians—specifically surrounding the most recent military 
incursion in 2014, which culminated in the death of over 2,200 Palestinians “70 percent [of 
whom] were confirmed civilians” (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 195). Scholars and activists 
dedicated to combatting Israel’s militarism in the post-peace process era must come to 
understand the various factors that have led to the rise of the new radical right, which 
essentially embrace and cultivate militaristic political cultures in Israel today; only by 
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exposing these factors and taking active steps to combat them can one truly engage in fruitful 
dialogue that will ultimately end the occupation and provide basic human rights for the 
Palestinians.   
 The peace process, established through the implementation of the Oslo Accords in 
1993, acted as a catalyst for the radical right in Israel to expand their original ideologies 
based primarily on territorial matters in the region and emerge as a new political group 
espousing views of xenophobia, security, nationalism, and anti-democratic values in order to 
directly combat the progresses made during the peace process. Although the Oslo Accords 
did not get to the root of the conflict, specifically surrounding Palestinian grievances, it did 
stipulate the transfer of power to the Palestinians to particularly control their own affairs after 
decades of Israeli rule, allowed for the expansion of the Palestinian Authority, and enabled 
Palestinians to freely move between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. To cease the transfer 
of power and territorial control to the Palestinians, the new radical right sought to take 
advantage of the ambiguities present in the reconciliation framework and began a nationwide 
campaign of political delegitimation of the Peace camp led by Rabin. The campaign to derail 
the peace process began when many within Israel began claiming that their leaders should 
have never engaged in dialogue with an organization they themselves deemed a terrorist 
group with an objective of eradicating the existence of the Jewish state—the PLO.  
 By inviting the PLO to the negotiating table to discuss ways in which both sides 
could achieve peace was, in the eyes of the radical right, an act that solidified the permanent 
danger of Israeli citizens and the abandonment of the state’s national interests. In order to 
recalibrate the power dynamics made anew by the peace process, the radical right began 
expanding illegal settlements in order to confiscate and occupy Palestinian land. The 
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occupation of illegal land by settlers rose by over two hundred percent years after the Oslo 
Accords, and resulted in the appropriation of Palestinian water and essential resources solely 
for the use of the local Jewish population. Predictably, because the Israeli government 
continued to provide resources and security to these illegal establishments while 
simultaneously seeking “peace,” the reconciliation period seemed to be increasingly 
problematic in the eyes of Palestinians and the international community. However, what 
essentially brought the peace process to an end was the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as 
Israel’s Prime Minister in 1996; for the first time the fate of the peace process was in the 
hands of a man who whole heartedly believed that seeking peace with the Palestinians should 
not be a primary concern of the state. The election of Netanyahu illustrated the impact of the 
new radical right and its influence as a dominant force in modern Israeli politics. “The Oslo 
agreement and its aftermath have increased Palestinian poverty and unemployment; … [and 
for] the Palestinians living under the ‘limited autonomy’ supposedly controlled by the PA, 
life has gotten worse, freedom less, and prospects diminished (Said, 2000 p.3). 
 Instead of focusing on establishing peace with their neighbors and embodying true 
democratic values, the radical right within Israel began using the illegal occupation and 
constant security threats against its citizens to their economic advantage. In 2001, Israel’s 
economy was hit particularly hard when the Dot-com bubble burst; in order to save the 
economy, Israel moved away from a traditional goods and services economy to one that 
focused solely on high-tech security. This high-tech security sector focuses primarily on 
surveillance, border protection, arms exports and imports, and homeland security products. 
The security industry has created an appetite for violence—Israel’s high-tech security 
expertise permeates a hyper-masculine, militaristic culture within Israel that thrives on 
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conflict in order to illustrate to the global community that the state knows how to protect 
itself against violent aggressors after decades of internal and external threats. The radical 
right uses every opportunity to broadcast to the international community that because they 
have dealt with the “Muslim” problem since the state’s creation, they know how to eliminate 
the threat. Peace, therefore, is counterproductive to the multi-billion dollar empire Israel has 
created for itself.  
 Social factors within Israel have also had a substantial impact on the political 
expansion and influence of the radical-right. For instance, the influx of roughly one million 
Soviet Jews into Israel in the beginning of the 1990s changed the political landscape of the 
country. In 1996, roughly 400,000 Russians were eligible to vote in the Israeli elections—
solidifying Benyamin Netanyahu’s win over Shimon Peres as Israel’s new Prime Minister. 
Many of the newcomers voted for Netanyahu because they believed the peace process 
jeopardized Israel’s national interest. More specifically, they could not fathom how the Labor 
party was so open to putting Israel’s holiest sites on the negotiating table and were fearful 
that if Peres won, he would dismantle the occupied territories (where most of the Russian 
migrants resided), in order to establish lasting peace with the Palestinians.  The ex-Soviet 
migrants were not particularly interested in making peace with their Palestinian neighbors 
because of their strong distrust towards Muslims, which stemmed from the Islamophobic 
climate of Communist rule in Russia. In addition, they viewed Palestinians as the main 
obstacle towards achieving a truly ethno-Jewish state. The arrival of Russians into Israel 
bolstered Zionist goals and helped the radical right gain parliamentary seats in the Knesset—
paving the way for a government who’s main priority would be establishing security through 
divisive policies versus establishing peace.   
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 The radical right’s most convincing tactic is the manipulation of fear present in Israeli 
society, which in turn, allows for Jews to rely heavily on their nation’s security establishment 
as the only means to guarantee their survival. Israeli’s live in constant existential fear; this 
stems from the origin of a young nation born from the distinctive scars of the Holocaust. The 
history of anti-Semitism created a state that continuously battles with hopelessness and 
collective anxiety from its traumatic past (Pedahzur, 2012, p.12). The radical-right uses these 
feelings of uncertainty to their own personal advantages; they attempt to convince the Jewish 
population that another Holocaust is imminent because Israel is the only Jewish nation in the 
world and is surrounded by immoral neighbors who wish for its demise. Members of the 
radical right continue to engage in fear mongering in order to indoctrinate the public with a 
sense of mistrust and paranoia against individuals who are not of Jewish decent; thus, making 
Israeli’s more sympathetic towards the Right’s ideology of security and anti-democratic 
values that ultimately hinder the nation from engaging in dialogue regarding Israel’s illegal 
occupation or its unwarranted militaristic stances.  
Resistance Within Palestine and the Larger Global Solidarity Movement 
 Israel’s exclusionary policies have expanded beyond a bureaucratic system of 
separation based on racial distinctions—it currently includes an intricate web of checkpoints, 
barriers, walls, bulldozers, and the increased presence of security forces that directly impact 
the lives of Palestinians on the ground everyday. The recent attacks on Gaza and the ongoing 
violence towards Palestinians are the culmination of a process “called ‘politicide,’ or the 
calculated destruction of part or an entire community of people in order to deny them self 
determination” (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 111). After 68 years of occupation, Israel continues to 
engage in various tactics to break the Palestinian spirit; to render them immobile as they are 
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stuck in the misery of their own lives under a colonial regime with no end in sight. However, 
Palestinians refuse to give up; refuse to give up their land, their privileges, and their culture 
and succumb to a colonialist entity. They are the world’s most resilient people—fighting 
every day for their right to basic political and human rights. As Edward Said stated so 
eloquently after the failed peace accords, “It always falls to the victims, not the oppressor, to 
show new paths for resistance, and the signs are that Palestinian civil society is beginning to 
take initiative. This is an excellent omen in a time of despondency and instinctual 
retrogression” (2000, p. xvii).  
 Many mainstream news outlets have tended to focus solely on Palestinian armed 
resistance groups in order to paint the indigenous group as uncompromising, violent terrorists 
who are unwilling to work with Israelis to put an end to the decades long conflict. There is 
almost never a discussion on how ordinary Palestinians are resisting the occupation every 
day in a nonviolent manner.  Forms of nonviolent resistance to Zionism have its roots well 
before the Balfour Declaration in 1917. In the beginning of the twentieth century, many 
Arabs were concerned of the rising number of Zionists in the region and began raising 
awareness of the dangers Europeans posed to Palestinian self-determination (Munayyer, 
2011). “Diplomatic efforts to lobby the mandatory government ensued while concurrently 
peasants occasionally clashed with the European newcomers, but violence was largely 
localized and communal and took place amid larger, more peaceful, and political efforts to 
resist Zionist aims” (Munayyer, 2011).  
 Against the backdrop of the Balfour Declaration and the influx of Zionists into 
Palestine, Arabs began holding numerous demonstrations and protests to combat Zionism. 
Unfortunately, the nonviolent demonstrations did not garner much support; the British were 
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quick to squash the protests with brute force in order to ensure that the Jewish people had a 
homeland—mainly to guarantee that Jews did not end up migrating to places such as the 
United Kingdom or the United States (Munayyer). Palestinian guerrilla movements only 
began to spring up as a result of the brutal response to nonviolent demonstrations. For 
example, it was the deadly attack of an 81-year old Arab man that inspired a “young imam 
living in Haifa named Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam [to organize] the first militant operation 
against the British mandatory government. His death in battle with British soldiers sparked 
the Arab rebellion that began in 1936 and lasted until 1939” (Munayyer).  
 Today, nonviolent demonstrations continue to take place in the occupied territories 
and Israel almost daily. “From the aid flotillas and convoys, along with [the] repeated 
demonstrations against buffer zones in Gaza, to protests against the separation wall […]; to 
demonstrations against home eviction and demolition in Jerusalem neighborhoods […]; to 
regular marches in refugee camps inside and outside of Palestine” (Munayyer). Whether it’s 
protesting the oppressive policies that leave people dispossessed or marching the streets to 
condemn another innocent life taken by the IDF; Palestinians do not give up on themselves 
or their nation. Millions continue to act in defiance every day by simply refusing to leave 
their homeland. As Asef Bayat illustrates, these small acts of defiance called the “ ‘quiet 
encroachments of the ordinary,’ encapsulates the discreet and prolonged ways in which the 
poor [or dispossessed] struggle to survive and to better their lives by quietly impinging on the 
propertied and powerful, and on society at large” (2010, p.15). This is a true example of 
bravery, especially for those living in occupied Jerusalem, where many are being driven from 
the city on a daily basis (Munayyer).  “For those who have never lived in a system of 
violence like the Israeli occupation, it is hard to understand how simply not going anywhere 
  48 
constitutes resistance, but when the objective of your oppressor is to get you to leave your 
land, staying put is part of the daily struggle” (Munayyer).  
 Although the strength and endurance of the Palestinian people is undeniable—they 
cannot combat the Israeli colonial machine without the support of an international movement 
that calls for the political and human rights of all Palestinian people. “The past has to be 
uncovered if it has been hidden; responsibility for wrongdoing has to be assigned and 
volunteered, denied or affirmed; proposals for atonement, reparation, or restitution have to be 
brought forward, analyzed, debated if in the past silence has prevailed” (Said, 2000, p. 12). 
Silence is no longer an option for many activists around the world who are committed to 
combatting Israel’s repressive policies and apartheid state alongside Palestinians. The 
Palestinian global solidarity movement—which constitutes a network of organizations and 
movements around the world with the aim of providing basic human rights for all 
Palestinians—took off around 2003 and has since attracted hundreds of supporters a day and 
led to tremendous gains towards promoting Palestinian independence and highlighting the 
plight of Arabs living under Israeli rule.  
 Advocating for the international boycott of Israeli goods and services has been the 
most successful effort sustained by the Palestinian global solidarity movement to date. “It 
was only in 2004 that the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of 
Israel (PACBI) was launched, and a year later that 170 Palestinian civil society groups issued 
what has come to be known as the BDS call” (Abunimah, 2014, p. 125). The Boycott, 
Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement was inspired by the international campaign against 
Apartheid South Africa in the 1970s, which urged companies to cease all relations with the 
country and boycott their goods and services until the state agreed to abide by basic human 
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rights and provide the majority Black population with the same rights and privileges offered 
to Whites. The BDS movement ultimately shed light on the plight of millions of Blacks 
living in South Africa under Apartheid and resulted in millions of dollars being divested from 
the state; creating mounting pressure to change the political landscape of the country to 
resemble true a Democracy. The BDS movement in South Africa was one of the main 
reasons Apartheid ended in 1994 and led to Nelson Mandela being the country’s first 
democratically elected Black President. Today, the BDS movement is appealing to members 
of global civil society to launch a comprehensive campaign to boycott, divest, and sanction 
Israeli goods and services until the country “respects the human rights and the right of self-
determination of Palestinians by ending its occupation and colonization of all the territories 
occupied in 1967, ending systematic discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, and 
respecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees, including the right of return” 
(Abunimah, 2014, p. 125). Although conscious of the stark differences between apartheid 
South Africa and the current colonial regime present in Israel and the occupied territories—
activists engaged with the BDS movement against Israel hope to put an end to oppressive 
policies much like they did in South Africa in the 1990s.  
 The BDS movement is growing at an unprecedented rate—making it increasingly 
difficult for Israeli officials to ignore. Just this past year for example, seven out of nine 
University of California institutions passed resolutions within their respective student 
governments to divest from corporations that profit from Israel’s illegal occupation. “A 
group of 63 members of the European Parliament from across the five largest political blocs 
in the parliament called on EU foreign policy chief to suspend the EU-Israel Association 
Agreement” (“BDS,” 2015).  The EU-Israel Association Agreement encourages the 
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interaction between European states and Israel in order to allow for the strengthening of 
“economic cooperation and cooperation on social matters” (Delegation, n.d.).  The call to 
suspend the Agreement also comes from over 300 organizations, including top trade unions 
and non-governmental organizations within the European Union in order to cease business 
with Israel. Since 2015, over 1,000 artists have pledged to join the cultural boycott of 
Israel—including legendary R&B singer and songwriter, Lauryn Hill. Associations around 
the world such as the American Anthropological Association and the US National Women’s 
Studies Association also helped to end the plight of Palestinians by adopting BDS ("BDS,” 
2015). These are only just a few of the advancements made by the grassroots movement. One 
of the most recently significant gains comes from the Brazilian government, which after 
months of civil society efforts, decided to pull out their contracts with the Israeli security 
company International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS). “The Israeli company 
announced in October 2014 that it had been awarded [a] $2.2 billion dollar deal to coordinate 
security at the [2016 Rio Olympics] games” ("BDS,” 2015). The retraction of the deal is 
significant because it combats Israel’s most lucrative industry: security. If more states and 
international institutions divest from Israel’s security regime, then they will have more 
economic incentive to start enacting policies that are closer in line to justice and true 
Democracy—or their entire economy will collapse.   
 The Palestinians finally have an international movement thriving with thousands of 
activists who want to put an end to the radical-right’s xenophobic and oppressive policies. 
Hundreds of universities worldwide participate in events designated to inform the public on 
what life is like living under an Israeli occupation. For instance, “more than 150 cities 
participate in Israeli Apartheid week [which consists of] panels, film screenings, and creative 
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actions” all to educate the public about the indigenous Palestinian population and gain more 
supporters for the BDS movement. Religious establishments are not exempt from 
participating and taking a stand against injustice. In June 2015, the United Church of Christ 
voted to divest and boycott from companies that violate international human rights laws in 
the occupied territories as well ("BDS,” 2015). All of these seemingly small pushbacks 
against the colonial state have contributed to a 46% decrease in Federal Direct Investment 
(FDI) in 2014 compared to the previous year in Israel, and the World Bank believes that a 
decrease of 24% in “Palestinian imports from Israel during the first quarter of 2015 [is] a 
strong sign that the boycott of Israeli goods by Palestinians is starting to hit the Israeli 
economy” ("BDS,” 2015). There is no doubt that Israel’s economy will begin to suffer once 
the BDS movement gains more traction; an Israeli report predicted that BDS could cost 
“Israel’s economy $1.4 billion dollars a year” if left unchallenged ("BDS,” 2015). 
 Israel and its Western allies have employed numerous tactics to combat, in some 
cases completely cease, the effects of the international Palestinian solidarity movement—
especially in regards to BDS. Netanyahu has recently claimed that the BDS movement is the 
new Iran—arguing that the ultimate goal of the BDS movement constitutes an existential 
threat to the livelihood of Israelis and their right to a Jewish state. This should come as no 
surprise to scholars and activists who have been engaged in the fight for Palestinian rights; 
Netanyahu, and the larger radical-right regime in Israel, have always heightened their 
feelings of panic surrounding an existential threat in order to justify, or distract, the 
international community from discussing the situation on the ground in regards to the 
occupation of the Palestinians (Abunimah, "Why BDS,” 2015) ”Netanyahu and other Israeli 
officials have continuously stated that they believe Israel is being held to unfair standards, 
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and that the rhetoric BDS employs calling for peace and equal rights for Palestinians is 
essentially rooted in Nazi ideology and contempt for the Jewish people. Needless to say, 
Israel is mobilizing extraordinary resources to counter the effects of BDS, for example, 
“Netanyahu decided to implement a 2014 resolution to establish a special task force to fight 
the anti-Israeli sanctions. The task force, standing at some 100 million Israeli shekels 
(roughly $25.5 million) and covering 10 new job positions, was approved in June as part of 
the budget of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs headed by Minister Gilad Erdan” (Peskin, 
2015). Jews around the world have also organized their efforts to ensure that Israel does not 
become isolated like apartheid South Africa did by the BDS movement. In 2010 the Jewish 
Foundations of North America and the Jewish Council for Public Affairs launched the “Israel 
Action Network (IAN).” With an initial budget of six million dollars provided by Jewish 
donors, the task of the Network is to combat anti-Israel forces linked to the BDS movement 
(Abunimah, 2014, p. 128). “The Network will seek to capitalize on the reach of North 
America’s 157 federations, 125 local Jewish community relations councils and nearly 400 
communities under the federation system” (Abunimah, 2014, p. 128).  
 The backlash surrounding the BDS movement goes beyond the work of Jews and the 
Israeli state itself. France—one of Israel’s close allies—has recently impeded the 
fundamental rights of its citizens to engage in free speech and their right to assemblage. A 
Palestinian solidarity group was asked by French authorities to dismantle their small 
demonstration in support of the BDS movement in the beginning of 2016. This comes as the 
“French Prime Minister announced that his government plans to intensify its restrictions on 
free speech targeting the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement” (Abunimah, 
"Defying Court,” 2016). The French government argues that the BDS movement is 
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intrinsically tied to hate-speech aimed against Jews and provokes discrimination. Thousands 
of French activists, scholars, artists, and conscious citizens have mobilized to repeal such a 
law that infringes on their rights to seek justice for Palestinians, and people’s right to inform 
the public about Israel’s illegal occupation (Abunimah, “Resistance to Israel,” 2016).  
 The United States—Israel’s closest ally—has developed a new, broad encompassing 
definition of what constitutes as anti-Semitism that inhibits individuals from criticizing Israel 
or Zionism by equating it with hatred of Jews. According to the State Department, “denying 
the Jewish people their right to self-determination, applying double standards to Israel, using 
the symbols and images associated with classic anti-Semitism to characterize Israel or 
Israelis, […] holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel” 
represents modern day anti-Semitism (United States, 2008). This new description of anti-
Semitism is incredibly problematic because to disagree with Zionist ideology “or to criticize 
Israeli policies and practices as a state [is] not at all anti-Semitic, but to exhibit hostility, 
hatred, and discrimination against Jews as a people or as individuals [is] indeed anti-
Semitism. Recall that Hitler did not persecute Jews for being Zionists, but for being Jews, for 
partaking of a race or ethnicity” (Falk, “Edward,” 2015). In other words, critiquing Zionist 
ideology or Israel as a state should not be equated with espousing hatred towards Jews as a 
people; instead, this creates an atmosphere of intimidation for scholars, activists, and 
conscious individuals dedicated to exposing Israel’s colonial state practices against the 
indigenous population. “It is a doubly unfortunate and dangerous tactic as it tends to weaken 
and confuse opposition to real anti-Semitism by this misleading linkage of a contentious 
political argument with a condemnation of racism” (Falk, “Edward,” 2015). 
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 This new definition of anti-Semitism is currently in the process of getting adopted 
into official University policy. The Board of Regents of the University of California are 
considering implementing the State Department’s definition of anti-Semitism, which would 
hinder the ability of students throughout the state to engage in protests and activities that call 
for a cease to Israel’s unilateral use of force and its absolute control over Palestinians. The 
UC President—Janet Napolitano—has called protests against Israel’s unlawful occupation of 
the West Bank racist and anti-Semitic in nature, which many students and faculty believe 
limits freedom of speech and the ability to educate the public on Zionism’s colonialist nature 
(Falk, “Edward,” 2015). If implemented, this would be an unprecedented attack on academic 
freedom and discourage students from standing up against any kind of modern-day 
oppression. It would ultimately stifle their voices and inhibit thousands of individuals from 
engaging in dialogue that could one day lead to the end of Israel’s occupation.  
 Regardless of the numerous strides taken towards establishing an independent, viable 
Palestinian state and the policies enacted within Israel and internationally to counter that 
possibility, a sustainable change will only take place once Palestinians and Israelis work 
together to counter Israel’s xenophobic policies towards the indigenous population. Without 
the voice of conscious seeking Israelis and a movement that counters the propaganda coming 
from the radical-right, there is very little possibility for viable change. It is essential to 
highlight the brave few who have refused to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces in order to 
resist their involvement in the Israeli occupation. Many Jews within Israel have engaged in 
various avenues to combat Israeli oppression and provide unbiased critic of the effects of 
occupation on the ground. For instance, there are many organizations in the occupied 
territories and within Israel that enable Palestinians and Israelis to work together as allies to 
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promote basic human and political rights throughout the region including, but not limited to, 
B’tselem, Gush Shalom, Not in My Name, Rabbis for Human Rights, etc. ("Israeli Human,” 
n.d.). Smaller Israeli human rights organizations, such as Checkpoint Watch (CPW), directly 
protest the occupation on the ground. CPW “is an all-women organization, currently 
including about four hundred activists, who stand in small groups at more than forty 
checkpoints” throughout the occupied territories and make sure to document and monitor all 
the activities conducted by the IDF soldiers as an attempt to ensure that Palestinians passing 
through are not treated in an inhumane fashion (Kotef, 2015, p.38). These small acts of 
resistance partaken by both Israelis and Palestinians can create a new path towards justice 
and peace. Any obstacle can be overcome if these two groups work together to counter the 
prominent dialogue of the radical-right within Israel and the international community. 
Individuals must continue to engage in the fight for Palestinian rights in order to illustrate to 
future generations that oppression of any people—regardless of their ethnicity, religion, 
gender, history, etc.—is inherently wrong and must be brought to justice.  
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